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Sudan TOURISM
Sudan Tourism
Sudan was a collection of small, independent kingdoms and principalities from the beginning of the Christian era until 1820-21, when Egypt conquered and unified the northern portion of the country. Historically, the pestilential swamps of the Suud discouraged expansion into the deeper south of the country. Although Egypt claimed all of the present Sudan during most of the 19th century, it was unable to establish effective control over southern Sudan, which remained an area of fragmented tribes subject to frequent attacks by slave raiders.
In 1881, a religious leader named Muhammad ibn Abdalla proclaimed himself the Mahdi, or the Òexpected one,Ó and began a religious crusade to unify the tribes in western and central Sudan. His followers took on the name ÒAnsarsÓ (the followers), which they continue to use today; they are associated with the single largest political grouping, the Umma Party, led by the descendant of the Mahdi, Sadiq al-Mahdi. Taking advantage of conditions resulting from Ottoman-Egyptian exploitation and maladministration, the Mahdi led a nationalist revolt culminating in the fall of Khartoum in 1885. The Mahdi died shortly thereafter, but his state survived until overwhelmed by an Ango-Egyptian force under Lord Kitchener in 1898. Sudan was proclaimed a condominium in 1899 under British-Egyptian administration. While maintaining the appearance of joint administration, the British Empire formulated policies and supplied most of the top administrators.
Independence
In February 1953, the United Kingdom and Egypt concluded an agreement providing for Sudanese self-government and self-determination. The transitional period toward independence began with the inauguration of the first parliament in 1954. With the consent of the British and Egyptian Governments, Sudan achieved independence on January 1, 1956, under a provisional constitution. The United States was among the first foreign powers to recognize the new state. However, the Arab-led Khartoum government reneged on promises to southerners to create a federal system, which led to a mutiny by southern army officers that sparked 17 years of civil war (1955-72).
The National Unionist Party (NUP), under Prime Minister Ismail al-Azhari, dominated the first cabinet, which was soon replaced by a coalition of conservative political forces. In 1958, following a period of economic difficulties and political maneuvering that paralyzed public administration, Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Ibrahim Abboud overthrew the parliamentary regime in a bloodless coup.
Gen. Abboud did not carry out his promises to return Sudan to civilian government, however, and popular resentment against army rule led to a wave of riots and strikes in late October 1964 that forced the military to relinquish power.
The Abboud regime was followed by a provisional government until parliamentary elections in April 1965 led to a coalition government of the Umma and National Unionist Parties under Prime Minister Muhammad Ahmad Mahjoub. Between 1966 and 1969, Sudan had a series of governments that proved unable either to agree on a permanent constitution or to cope with problems of factionalism, economic stagnation, and ethnic dissidence. The succession of early post-independence governments were dominated by Arab Muslims who viewed Sudan as a Muslim Arab state. Indeed, the Umma/NUP-proposed 1968 constitution was arguably SudanÕs first Islamic-oriented constitution.
Dissatisfaction culminated in a second military coup on May 25, 1969. The coup leader, Col. Gaafar Muhammad Nimeiri, became Prime Minister, and the new regime abolished parliament and outlawed all political parties.
Disputes between Marxist and non-Marxist elements within the ruling military coalition resulted in a briefly successful coup in July 1971, led by the Sudanese Communist Party. Several days later, anti-communist military elements restored Nimeiri to power.
In 1972, the Addis Ababa agreement led to a cessation of the north-south civil war and a degree of self-rule. This led to a period of 10 years of hiatus in the civil war.
In 1976, the Ansars mounted a bloody but unsuccessful coup attempt. In July 1977, President Nimeiri met with Ansar leader Sadiq al-Mahdi, opening the way for reconciliation. Hundreds of political prisoners were released, and in August 1977 a general amnesty was announced for all opponents of NimeiriÕs government.
In September 1983, as part of an Islamicization campaign, President Nimeiri announced his decision to incorporate traditional Islamic punishments drawn from ShariÕa (Islamic law) into the penal code. This was controversial even among Muslim groups. After questioning NimeiriÕs credentials to Islamicize SudanÕs society, Ansar leader Sadiq al-Mahdi was placed under house arrest. President Nimeiri declared a state of emergency, in part to ensure that ShariÕa was applied more broadly. Most constitutionally guaranteed rights were suspended. In the north, emergency courts, later known as Òdecisive justice courts,Ó were established, with summary jurisdiction over criminal cases. Amputations for theft and public lashings for alcohol possession were common during the state of emergency. Southerners and other non-Muslims living in the north were also subjected to these punishments. These events, and other longstanding grievances, in part led to a resumption of the civil war that had been in abeyance since 1972, and the war continues today.
In September 1984, President Nimeiri announced the end of the state of emergency and dismantled the emergency courts but soon promulgated a new judiciary act, which continued many of the practices of the emergency courts. Despite NimeiriÕs public assurances that the rights of non-Muslims would be respected, southerners and other non-Muslims remained deeply suspicious.
Early 1985 saw serious shortages of fuel and bread in Khartoum, a growing insurgency in the south, drought and famine, and an increasingly difficult refugee burden. In early April, during NimeiriÕs absence from the country, massive demonstrations, first triggered by price increases on bread and other staples, broke out in Khartoum.
On April 6, 1985 senior military officers led by Gen. Suwar al-Dahab mounted a coup. Among the first acts of the new government was to suspend the 1983 constitution and disband NimeiriÕs Sudan Socialist Union. A 15-member transitional military council was named, chaired by Gen. Suwar al-Dahab. In consultation with an informal conference of political parties, unions, and professional organizations known as the ÒGathering,Ó the council appointed an interim civilian cabinet, headed by Prime Minister Dr. Al Gizouli Defalla.
Elections were held in April 1986, and the transitional military council turned over power to a civilian government as promised. The government, headed by Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi of the Umma Party, consisted of a coalition of the Umma, DUP (formerly NUP), the National Islamic Front (Hassan al-TurabiÕs NIF) and several southern parties. This coalition dissolved and reformed several times over the next few years, with Sadiq al-Mahdi and his Umma party always in a central role.
During this period, the civil war intensified in lethality and the economy continued to deteriorate. When prices of basic goods were increased in 1988, riots ensued, and the price increases were canceled. The civil war was particularly divisive (see ÒCivil StrifeÓ below). When Sadiq al-Mahdi refused to approve a peace plan reached by the DUP and the Sudan PeopleÕs Liberation Army (SPLA) in November 1988, the DUP left the government. The new government consisted essentially of the Umma and the Islamic fundamentalist NIF.
In February 1989, the army presented Sadiq with an ultimatum: he could move toward peace or be thrown out. He formed a new government with the DUP and approved the SPLA/DUP agreement. On June 30, 1989, however, military officers under then-Col. Omar Hassan al-Bashir, with NIF instigation and support, replaced the government with the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (RCC), a junta comprised of 15 (reduced to 12 in 1991) military officers assisted by a civilian cabinet. General al-Bashir became President and chief of state, Prime Minister and chief of the armed forces. He continues to hold executive authority over the Khartoum government.
In March 1991, a new penal code, the Criminal Act of 1991, instituted harsh punishments nationwide, including amputations and stoning. Although the southern states are ÒofficiallyÓ exempt from these Islamic prohibitions and penalties, the 1991 act provides for a possible future application of Islamic law (ShariÕa) in the south. In 1993, the government transferred all non-Muslim judges from the south to the north, replacing them with Muslim judges. The introduction of Public Order Police to enforce ShariÕa law resulted in the arrest and treatment under ShariÕa law of southerners and other non-Muslims living in the north.
Civil Strife
In 1955, southern resentment of northern Muslim Arab domination culminated in a mutiny among southern troops in Equatoria Province. For the next 17 years, the southern region experienced civil strife, and various southern leaders agitated for regional autonomy or outright secession.
This chronic state of insurgency against the central government was suspended in 1972 after the signing of the Addis Ababa Accords granting southern Sudan wide regional autonomy on internal matters. But a 1983 decree by President Nimeiri that declared his intention to transform Sudan into a Muslim Arab state, and divided the south into three regions and instituted ShariÕa law, revived southern opposition and militant insurgency.
After the 1985 coup, the new government rescinded this decree and made other significant overtures aimed at reconciling north and south but did not rescind the so-called September Laws of the Nimeiri regime instituting ShariÕa law. In May 1986, the Sadiq al-Mahdi government began peace negotiations with the SPLA, led by Col. John Garang de Mabior. In that year the SPLA and a number of Sudanese political parties met in Ethiopia and agreed to the ÒKoka DamÓ declaration, which called for abolishing Islamic law and convening a constitutional conference. In 1988, the SPLA and the DUP agreed on a peace plan calling for the abolition of military pacts with Egypt and Libya, freezing of Islamic law, an end to the state of emergency, and a cease-fire. A constitutional conference would then be convened.
Following an ultimatum from the armed forces in February 1989, the Sadiq al-Mahdi government approved this peace plan and engaged in several rounds of talks with the SPLA. A constitutional conference was tentatively planned for September 1989. The military government, which took over on June 30, 1989, however, repudiated the DUP/SPLA agreement and stated it wished to negotiate with the SPLA without preconditions. Negotiating sessions in August and December 1989 brought little progress. The SPLA controlled large areas of Equatoria, Bahr al Ghazal, and Upper Nile provinces and also operated in the southern portions of Darfur, Kordofan, and Blue Nile provinces. The government controlled a number of the major southern towns and cities, including Juba, Wau, and Malakal. An informal cease-fire in May broke down in October 1989, and fighting has continued since then.
In August 1991, internal dissension among the rebels led opponents of Colonel GarangÕs leadership of the SPLA to form the so-called Nasir faction of the rebel army. In September 1992, William Nyuon Bany formed a second rebel faction, and in February 1993, Kerubino Kwanyin Bol formed a third rebel faction. On April 5, 1993, the three dissident rebel factions announced a coalition of their groups called SPLA United at a press conference in Nairobi, Kenya. The factions clashed occasionally, and the rebels lost much of their credibility with the West.
In 1993, the leaders of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya formed the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to pursue a peace initiative for the Sudan. The IGAD initiative promulgated the 1994 Declaration of Principles (DOP) that aimed to identify the essential elements necessary to a just and comprehensive peace settlement--the relationship between religion and the state, powersharing, wealthsharing, and the right of self-determination for the south. The Sudanese Government did not sign the DOP until 1997 after major battlefield losses to the SPLA.
In 1995, a coalition of internal and exiled opposition parties in the north and the south created the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) as an anti-government umbrella group. This development opened a northeastern front to the civil war, making it more than before a center-periphery rather than simply a north-south conflict. The SPLA, DUP, and Umma Parties were the key groups forming the NDA, along with several smaller parties and northern ethnic groups.
In 1997, the government signed a series of agreements with rebel factions, led by former Garang lieutenant Riek Machar, under the banner of ÒPeace from Within.Ó These included the Khartoum, Nuba Mountains, and Fashoda agreements that ended military conflict between the government and significant rebel factions. Many of those leaders then moved to Khartoum where they assumed marginal roles in the central government, or collaborated with the government in military engagements against the SPLA. These three agreements paralleled the terms and conditions of the IGAD agreement, calling for a degree of autonomy for the south and the right of self-determination.
In July 2000, the Libyan/Egyptian Joint Initiative on the Sudan was mooted, calling for the establishment of an interim government, powersharing, constitutional reform, and new elections. Southern critics objected to the joint initiative because it neglected to address issues of the relationship between religion and the state and failed to mention the right of self-determination. It is unclear to what extent this initiative will have a significant impact on the search for peace, as some critics view it as more aimed at a resolution among northern political parties and protecting the perceived security interests of Egypt in favor of the unity of the Sudan.
In September 2001, former Senator John Danforth was designated Presidential Envoy for Peace in the Sudan. His role aimed to explore the prospects that the U.S. could play a useful catalytic role in the search for a just end to the civil war, and enhance humanitarian services delivery that could help reduce the suffering of the Sudanese people stemming from war-related effects.
In July 2002, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan PeopleÕs Liberation Movement/Army reached a historic agreement on the role of state and religion and the right of southern Sudan to self-determination. This agreement, known as the Machakos Protocol and named after the town in Kenya where the peace talks were held, concluded the first round of talks sponsored by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. The effort was mediated by Kenyan General Lazaro Sumbeiywo. Peace talks resumed and continued during 2003, with discussions regarding wealth sharing and three contested areas.
A rebellion broke out in Darfur, in western Sudan, in 2003, led by two rebel groups--the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). In seeking to defeat the rebel movements, the Government of Sudan armed and supported local tribal and other militias, which have come to be known as the "Jingaweit." Attacks on the civilian population by the Jingaweit, often with the direct support of Government of Sudan forces, have led to the death of tens of thousands of persons in Darfur. Some two million persons have been internally displaced in Darfur; an additional 213,000 have sought refuge from the conflict in neighboring Chad.
On September 9, 2004, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the Government of Sudan and the Jingaweit bear responsibilityÐand that genocide may still be occurring."
A cease-fire between the parties was signed in NÕdjamena, Chad, on April 8, 2004; despite the deployment of an African Union observer force to monitor implementation of the cease-fire and investigate violations, violence has continued. The SLA/M and JEM have continued negotiations with the Government of Sudan under mediation of the African Union. These talks resulted in additional protocols on addressing the humanitarian and security aspects of the conflict on November 9, 2004. Like previous agreements, these have been violated by both sides. The African Union, with the support of the United Nations Security Council, the United States, and the rest of the international community, began deploying a larger monitoring and observer force in October 2004. The mandate of this force, which will eventually have more than 3,300 personnel, includes some aspects of protection of the civilian population.
The United Nations Security Council had passed three resolutions (1556, 1564, and 1574), all intended to move the Government of Sudan to rein in the Jingaweit, protect the civilian population and humanitarian participants, seek avenues toward a political settlement to the humanitarian and political crisis, and recognize the need for the rapid deployment of an expanded African Union mission in Darfur. The United States has been a leader in pressing for strong international action by the United Nations and its agencies. In February 2005, the U.S. circulated a draft resolution in the UN Security Council that would establish a UN peace support operation in the Sudan and includes measures to pressure the parties to the Darfur conflict to abide by their commitments in previous resolutions, including targeted sanctions.
On November 19, 2004, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan PeopleÕs Liberation Movement/Army signed a declaration committing themselves to conclude a final comprehensive peace agreement by December 31, 2004, in the context of a special session of the United Nations Security Council in Nairobi, KenyaÑonly the fourth time the Council has met outside of New York since its founding. At this session, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1574, which welcomed the commitment of the government and the SPLM/A to achieve agreement by the end of 2004, and underscored the international communityÕs intention to assist the Sudanese people and support implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement. It also demanded that the Government of Sudan and the SLA/M and JEM halt all violence in Darfur.
In keeping with their commitment to the Security Council, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan PeopleÕs Liberation Movement/Army initialed the final elements of the comprehensive agreement on December 31, 2004. The two parties formally signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on January 9, 2005. The United States and the international community have welcomed this decisive step forward for peace in Sudan.
A series of UN Security Council resolutions in late March 2005 underscored the concerns of the international community regarding Sudan's continuing conflicts. Resolution 1590 of March 24 established the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) for an initial period of six months and decided that UNMIS would consist of up to 10,000 military personnel and up to 715 civilian police personnel. It requested UNMIS to coordinate with the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to foster peace in Darfur, support implementation of the CPA, facilitate the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons, provide humanitarian demining assistance, and protect human rights. The resolution also called on the Government of Sudan and rebel groups to resume the Abuja talks and support a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Darfur, including ensuring safe access for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.
Resolution 1591 of March 29 criticized the Government of Sudan and rebels in Darfur for having failed to comply with several previous Security Council resolutions, for ceasefire violations, and for human rights abuses. The resolution also calls on all parties to resume the Abuja talks and to support a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Darfur; it also forms a monitoring committee charged with enforcing a travel ban and asset freeze of those determined to impede the peace process, or violate human rights. The resolution additionally demanded that the Government of Sudan cease conducting offensive military flights in and over the Darfur region.
Finally, Resolution 1593 referred the situation in Darfur to the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and called on the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur to cooperate with the ICC.
As of April 2005, large-scale conflict in Darfur had diminished, although attacks on humanitarian operations increased, rendering assistance to internally displaced and vulnerable persons hazardous. Overall international assistance levels reached more than $1.3 billion since the UN's September 2003 appeal; principal implementing agencies included the World Food Program (WFP), UNHCR, UNICEF, and various non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
On April 28, 2005, the African Union decided to expand its 3,320-member peacekeeping operation to approximately 7,700 total personnel by September 2005. This will include roughly 5,500 troops, 1,600 civilian police, and 700 military observers.
The civil war had displaced more than 4 million southerners. Some fled into southern cities, such as Juba; others trekked as far north as Khartoum and even into Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Egypt, and other neighboring countries. These people were unable to grow food or earn money to feed themselves, and malnutrition and starvation became widespread. The lack of investment in the south resulted as well in what international humanitarian organizations call a Òlost generationÓ who lack educational opportunities and access to basic health care services, and who have little prospect for productive employment in the small and weak economies of the south or the north. Following an internal outcry, the Sadiq al-Mahdi government in March 1989 agreed with the UN and donor nations (including the U.S.) on a plan called Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), under which some 100,000 metric tons of food was moved into both government and SPLA-held areas of the Sudan, and widespread starvation was averted. Phase II of OLS to cover 1990 was approved by both the government and the SPLA in March 1990. In 1991, Sudan faced a 2-year drought and food shortage across the entire country. The U.S., UN, and other donors attempted to mount a coordinated international relief effort in both north and south Sudan to prevent a catastrophe. However, due to SudanÕs human rights abuses and its pro-Iraqi stance during the Gulf War, many donors cut much of their aid to the Sudan. In a similar drought in 2000-01, the U.S. and the international community again responded to avert mass starvation in the Sudan. The U.S. and other donors continue to provide large amounts of humanitarian aid to all parts of the Sudan.
In 1881, a religious leader named Muhammad ibn Abdalla proclaimed himself the Mahdi, or the Òexpected one,Ó and began a religious crusade to unify the tribes in western and central Sudan. His followers took on the name ÒAnsarsÓ (the followers), which they continue to use today; they are associated with the single largest political grouping, the Umma Party, led by the descendant of the Mahdi, Sadiq al-Mahdi. Taking advantage of conditions resulting from Ottoman-Egyptian exploitation and maladministration, the Mahdi led a nationalist revolt culminating in the fall of Khartoum in 1885. The Mahdi died shortly thereafter, but his state survived until overwhelmed by an Ango-Egyptian force under Lord Kitchener in 1898. Sudan was proclaimed a condominium in 1899 under British-Egyptian administration. While maintaining the appearance of joint administration, the British Empire formulated policies and supplied most of the top administrators.
Independence
In February 1953, the United Kingdom and Egypt concluded an agreement providing for Sudanese self-government and self-determination. The transitional period toward independence began with the inauguration of the first parliament in 1954. With the consent of the British and Egyptian Governments, Sudan achieved independence on January 1, 1956, under a provisional constitution. The United States was among the first foreign powers to recognize the new state. However, the Arab-led Khartoum government reneged on promises to southerners to create a federal system, which led to a mutiny by southern army officers that sparked 17 years of civil war (1955-72).
The National Unionist Party (NUP), under Prime Minister Ismail al-Azhari, dominated the first cabinet, which was soon replaced by a coalition of conservative political forces. In 1958, following a period of economic difficulties and political maneuvering that paralyzed public administration, Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Ibrahim Abboud overthrew the parliamentary regime in a bloodless coup.
Gen. Abboud did not carry out his promises to return Sudan to civilian government, however, and popular resentment against army rule led to a wave of riots and strikes in late October 1964 that forced the military to relinquish power.
The Abboud regime was followed by a provisional government until parliamentary elections in April 1965 led to a coalition government of the Umma and National Unionist Parties under Prime Minister Muhammad Ahmad Mahjoub. Between 1966 and 1969, Sudan had a series of governments that proved unable either to agree on a permanent constitution or to cope with problems of factionalism, economic stagnation, and ethnic dissidence. The succession of early post-independence governments were dominated by Arab Muslims who viewed Sudan as a Muslim Arab state. Indeed, the Umma/NUP-proposed 1968 constitution was arguably SudanÕs first Islamic-oriented constitution.
Dissatisfaction culminated in a second military coup on May 25, 1969. The coup leader, Col. Gaafar Muhammad Nimeiri, became Prime Minister, and the new regime abolished parliament and outlawed all political parties.
Disputes between Marxist and non-Marxist elements within the ruling military coalition resulted in a briefly successful coup in July 1971, led by the Sudanese Communist Party. Several days later, anti-communist military elements restored Nimeiri to power.
In 1972, the Addis Ababa agreement led to a cessation of the north-south civil war and a degree of self-rule. This led to a period of 10 years of hiatus in the civil war.
In 1976, the Ansars mounted a bloody but unsuccessful coup attempt. In July 1977, President Nimeiri met with Ansar leader Sadiq al-Mahdi, opening the way for reconciliation. Hundreds of political prisoners were released, and in August 1977 a general amnesty was announced for all opponents of NimeiriÕs government.
In September 1983, as part of an Islamicization campaign, President Nimeiri announced his decision to incorporate traditional Islamic punishments drawn from ShariÕa (Islamic law) into the penal code. This was controversial even among Muslim groups. After questioning NimeiriÕs credentials to Islamicize SudanÕs society, Ansar leader Sadiq al-Mahdi was placed under house arrest. President Nimeiri declared a state of emergency, in part to ensure that ShariÕa was applied more broadly. Most constitutionally guaranteed rights were suspended. In the north, emergency courts, later known as Òdecisive justice courts,Ó were established, with summary jurisdiction over criminal cases. Amputations for theft and public lashings for alcohol possession were common during the state of emergency. Southerners and other non-Muslims living in the north were also subjected to these punishments. These events, and other longstanding grievances, in part led to a resumption of the civil war that had been in abeyance since 1972, and the war continues today.
In September 1984, President Nimeiri announced the end of the state of emergency and dismantled the emergency courts but soon promulgated a new judiciary act, which continued many of the practices of the emergency courts. Despite NimeiriÕs public assurances that the rights of non-Muslims would be respected, southerners and other non-Muslims remained deeply suspicious.
Early 1985 saw serious shortages of fuel and bread in Khartoum, a growing insurgency in the south, drought and famine, and an increasingly difficult refugee burden. In early April, during NimeiriÕs absence from the country, massive demonstrations, first triggered by price increases on bread and other staples, broke out in Khartoum.
On April 6, 1985 senior military officers led by Gen. Suwar al-Dahab mounted a coup. Among the first acts of the new government was to suspend the 1983 constitution and disband NimeiriÕs Sudan Socialist Union. A 15-member transitional military council was named, chaired by Gen. Suwar al-Dahab. In consultation with an informal conference of political parties, unions, and professional organizations known as the ÒGathering,Ó the council appointed an interim civilian cabinet, headed by Prime Minister Dr. Al Gizouli Defalla.
Elections were held in April 1986, and the transitional military council turned over power to a civilian government as promised. The government, headed by Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi of the Umma Party, consisted of a coalition of the Umma, DUP (formerly NUP), the National Islamic Front (Hassan al-TurabiÕs NIF) and several southern parties. This coalition dissolved and reformed several times over the next few years, with Sadiq al-Mahdi and his Umma party always in a central role.
During this period, the civil war intensified in lethality and the economy continued to deteriorate. When prices of basic goods were increased in 1988, riots ensued, and the price increases were canceled. The civil war was particularly divisive (see ÒCivil StrifeÓ below). When Sadiq al-Mahdi refused to approve a peace plan reached by the DUP and the Sudan PeopleÕs Liberation Army (SPLA) in November 1988, the DUP left the government. The new government consisted essentially of the Umma and the Islamic fundamentalist NIF.
In February 1989, the army presented Sadiq with an ultimatum: he could move toward peace or be thrown out. He formed a new government with the DUP and approved the SPLA/DUP agreement. On June 30, 1989, however, military officers under then-Col. Omar Hassan al-Bashir, with NIF instigation and support, replaced the government with the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (RCC), a junta comprised of 15 (reduced to 12 in 1991) military officers assisted by a civilian cabinet. General al-Bashir became President and chief of state, Prime Minister and chief of the armed forces. He continues to hold executive authority over the Khartoum government.
In March 1991, a new penal code, the Criminal Act of 1991, instituted harsh punishments nationwide, including amputations and stoning. Although the southern states are ÒofficiallyÓ exempt from these Islamic prohibitions and penalties, the 1991 act provides for a possible future application of Islamic law (ShariÕa) in the south. In 1993, the government transferred all non-Muslim judges from the south to the north, replacing them with Muslim judges. The introduction of Public Order Police to enforce ShariÕa law resulted in the arrest and treatment under ShariÕa law of southerners and other non-Muslims living in the north.
Civil Strife
In 1955, southern resentment of northern Muslim Arab domination culminated in a mutiny among southern troops in Equatoria Province. For the next 17 years, the southern region experienced civil strife, and various southern leaders agitated for regional autonomy or outright secession.
This chronic state of insurgency against the central government was suspended in 1972 after the signing of the Addis Ababa Accords granting southern Sudan wide regional autonomy on internal matters. But a 1983 decree by President Nimeiri that declared his intention to transform Sudan into a Muslim Arab state, and divided the south into three regions and instituted ShariÕa law, revived southern opposition and militant insurgency.
After the 1985 coup, the new government rescinded this decree and made other significant overtures aimed at reconciling north and south but did not rescind the so-called September Laws of the Nimeiri regime instituting ShariÕa law. In May 1986, the Sadiq al-Mahdi government began peace negotiations with the SPLA, led by Col. John Garang de Mabior. In that year the SPLA and a number of Sudanese political parties met in Ethiopia and agreed to the ÒKoka DamÓ declaration, which called for abolishing Islamic law and convening a constitutional conference. In 1988, the SPLA and the DUP agreed on a peace plan calling for the abolition of military pacts with Egypt and Libya, freezing of Islamic law, an end to the state of emergency, and a cease-fire. A constitutional conference would then be convened.
Following an ultimatum from the armed forces in February 1989, the Sadiq al-Mahdi government approved this peace plan and engaged in several rounds of talks with the SPLA. A constitutional conference was tentatively planned for September 1989. The military government, which took over on June 30, 1989, however, repudiated the DUP/SPLA agreement and stated it wished to negotiate with the SPLA without preconditions. Negotiating sessions in August and December 1989 brought little progress. The SPLA controlled large areas of Equatoria, Bahr al Ghazal, and Upper Nile provinces and also operated in the southern portions of Darfur, Kordofan, and Blue Nile provinces. The government controlled a number of the major southern towns and cities, including Juba, Wau, and Malakal. An informal cease-fire in May broke down in October 1989, and fighting has continued since then.
In August 1991, internal dissension among the rebels led opponents of Colonel GarangÕs leadership of the SPLA to form the so-called Nasir faction of the rebel army. In September 1992, William Nyuon Bany formed a second rebel faction, and in February 1993, Kerubino Kwanyin Bol formed a third rebel faction. On April 5, 1993, the three dissident rebel factions announced a coalition of their groups called SPLA United at a press conference in Nairobi, Kenya. The factions clashed occasionally, and the rebels lost much of their credibility with the West.
In 1993, the leaders of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya formed the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to pursue a peace initiative for the Sudan. The IGAD initiative promulgated the 1994 Declaration of Principles (DOP) that aimed to identify the essential elements necessary to a just and comprehensive peace settlement--the relationship between religion and the state, powersharing, wealthsharing, and the right of self-determination for the south. The Sudanese Government did not sign the DOP until 1997 after major battlefield losses to the SPLA.
In 1995, a coalition of internal and exiled opposition parties in the north and the south created the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) as an anti-government umbrella group. This development opened a northeastern front to the civil war, making it more than before a center-periphery rather than simply a north-south conflict. The SPLA, DUP, and Umma Parties were the key groups forming the NDA, along with several smaller parties and northern ethnic groups.
In 1997, the government signed a series of agreements with rebel factions, led by former Garang lieutenant Riek Machar, under the banner of ÒPeace from Within.Ó These included the Khartoum, Nuba Mountains, and Fashoda agreements that ended military conflict between the government and significant rebel factions. Many of those leaders then moved to Khartoum where they assumed marginal roles in the central government, or collaborated with the government in military engagements against the SPLA. These three agreements paralleled the terms and conditions of the IGAD agreement, calling for a degree of autonomy for the south and the right of self-determination.
In July 2000, the Libyan/Egyptian Joint Initiative on the Sudan was mooted, calling for the establishment of an interim government, powersharing, constitutional reform, and new elections. Southern critics objected to the joint initiative because it neglected to address issues of the relationship between religion and the state and failed to mention the right of self-determination. It is unclear to what extent this initiative will have a significant impact on the search for peace, as some critics view it as more aimed at a resolution among northern political parties and protecting the perceived security interests of Egypt in favor of the unity of the Sudan.
In September 2001, former Senator John Danforth was designated Presidential Envoy for Peace in the Sudan. His role aimed to explore the prospects that the U.S. could play a useful catalytic role in the search for a just end to the civil war, and enhance humanitarian services delivery that could help reduce the suffering of the Sudanese people stemming from war-related effects.
In July 2002, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan PeopleÕs Liberation Movement/Army reached a historic agreement on the role of state and religion and the right of southern Sudan to self-determination. This agreement, known as the Machakos Protocol and named after the town in Kenya where the peace talks were held, concluded the first round of talks sponsored by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. The effort was mediated by Kenyan General Lazaro Sumbeiywo. Peace talks resumed and continued during 2003, with discussions regarding wealth sharing and three contested areas.
A rebellion broke out in Darfur, in western Sudan, in 2003, led by two rebel groups--the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). In seeking to defeat the rebel movements, the Government of Sudan armed and supported local tribal and other militias, which have come to be known as the "Jingaweit." Attacks on the civilian population by the Jingaweit, often with the direct support of Government of Sudan forces, have led to the death of tens of thousands of persons in Darfur. Some two million persons have been internally displaced in Darfur; an additional 213,000 have sought refuge from the conflict in neighboring Chad.
On September 9, 2004, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the Government of Sudan and the Jingaweit bear responsibilityÐand that genocide may still be occurring."
A cease-fire between the parties was signed in NÕdjamena, Chad, on April 8, 2004; despite the deployment of an African Union observer force to monitor implementation of the cease-fire and investigate violations, violence has continued. The SLA/M and JEM have continued negotiations with the Government of Sudan under mediation of the African Union. These talks resulted in additional protocols on addressing the humanitarian and security aspects of the conflict on November 9, 2004. Like previous agreements, these have been violated by both sides. The African Union, with the support of the United Nations Security Council, the United States, and the rest of the international community, began deploying a larger monitoring and observer force in October 2004. The mandate of this force, which will eventually have more than 3,300 personnel, includes some aspects of protection of the civilian population.
The United Nations Security Council had passed three resolutions (1556, 1564, and 1574), all intended to move the Government of Sudan to rein in the Jingaweit, protect the civilian population and humanitarian participants, seek avenues toward a political settlement to the humanitarian and political crisis, and recognize the need for the rapid deployment of an expanded African Union mission in Darfur. The United States has been a leader in pressing for strong international action by the United Nations and its agencies. In February 2005, the U.S. circulated a draft resolution in the UN Security Council that would establish a UN peace support operation in the Sudan and includes measures to pressure the parties to the Darfur conflict to abide by their commitments in previous resolutions, including targeted sanctions.
On November 19, 2004, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan PeopleÕs Liberation Movement/Army signed a declaration committing themselves to conclude a final comprehensive peace agreement by December 31, 2004, in the context of a special session of the United Nations Security Council in Nairobi, KenyaÑonly the fourth time the Council has met outside of New York since its founding. At this session, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1574, which welcomed the commitment of the government and the SPLM/A to achieve agreement by the end of 2004, and underscored the international communityÕs intention to assist the Sudanese people and support implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement. It also demanded that the Government of Sudan and the SLA/M and JEM halt all violence in Darfur.
In keeping with their commitment to the Security Council, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan PeopleÕs Liberation Movement/Army initialed the final elements of the comprehensive agreement on December 31, 2004. The two parties formally signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on January 9, 2005. The United States and the international community have welcomed this decisive step forward for peace in Sudan.
A series of UN Security Council resolutions in late March 2005 underscored the concerns of the international community regarding Sudan's continuing conflicts. Resolution 1590 of March 24 established the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) for an initial period of six months and decided that UNMIS would consist of up to 10,000 military personnel and up to 715 civilian police personnel. It requested UNMIS to coordinate with the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to foster peace in Darfur, support implementation of the CPA, facilitate the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons, provide humanitarian demining assistance, and protect human rights. The resolution also called on the Government of Sudan and rebel groups to resume the Abuja talks and support a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Darfur, including ensuring safe access for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.
Resolution 1591 of March 29 criticized the Government of Sudan and rebels in Darfur for having failed to comply with several previous Security Council resolutions, for ceasefire violations, and for human rights abuses. The resolution also calls on all parties to resume the Abuja talks and to support a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Darfur; it also forms a monitoring committee charged with enforcing a travel ban and asset freeze of those determined to impede the peace process, or violate human rights. The resolution additionally demanded that the Government of Sudan cease conducting offensive military flights in and over the Darfur region.
Finally, Resolution 1593 referred the situation in Darfur to the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and called on the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur to cooperate with the ICC.
As of April 2005, large-scale conflict in Darfur had diminished, although attacks on humanitarian operations increased, rendering assistance to internally displaced and vulnerable persons hazardous. Overall international assistance levels reached more than $1.3 billion since the UN's September 2003 appeal; principal implementing agencies included the World Food Program (WFP), UNHCR, UNICEF, and various non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
On April 28, 2005, the African Union decided to expand its 3,320-member peacekeeping operation to approximately 7,700 total personnel by September 2005. This will include roughly 5,500 troops, 1,600 civilian police, and 700 military observers.
The civil war had displaced more than 4 million southerners. Some fled into southern cities, such as Juba; others trekked as far north as Khartoum and even into Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Egypt, and other neighboring countries. These people were unable to grow food or earn money to feed themselves, and malnutrition and starvation became widespread. The lack of investment in the south resulted as well in what international humanitarian organizations call a Òlost generationÓ who lack educational opportunities and access to basic health care services, and who have little prospect for productive employment in the small and weak economies of the south or the north. Following an internal outcry, the Sadiq al-Mahdi government in March 1989 agreed with the UN and donor nations (including the U.S.) on a plan called Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), under which some 100,000 metric tons of food was moved into both government and SPLA-held areas of the Sudan, and widespread starvation was averted. Phase II of OLS to cover 1990 was approved by both the government and the SPLA in March 1990. In 1991, Sudan faced a 2-year drought and food shortage across the entire country. The U.S., UN, and other donors attempted to mount a coordinated international relief effort in both north and south Sudan to prevent a catastrophe. However, due to SudanÕs human rights abuses and its pro-Iraqi stance during the Gulf War, many donors cut much of their aid to the Sudan. In a similar drought in 2000-01, the U.S. and the international community again responded to avert mass starvation in the Sudan. The U.S. and other donors continue to provide large amounts of humanitarian aid to all parts of the Sudan.
